Research

Publications and research by Noah Buckley on Russian politics, authoritarian regimes, elections, public opinion, and corruption.

Publications

The Demand for Elections under Autocracy: Regime Approval and the Elimination of Local Elections in Russia (with Quintin Beazer and Ora John Reuter) American Journal of Political Science, forthcoming

Abstract Most contemporary autocracies hold elections. Does the public value these elections and, if so, do they value them enough to punish incumbents that subvert elections? We examine this question in the case of contemporary Russia by examining whether individuals withdraw support from regime leaders when local elections are abolished. Over the past 20 years, most Russian cities have replaced their directly elected mayors with appointed chief executives. This paper uses the largest dataset on public opinion ever assembled on Russia—containing over 1.4 million polling responses drawn from two decades of polling by Russia’s top polling agencies—to analyze how the abolition of elections in Russia’s large cities has affected public attitudes toward the authorities. We find that election abolition reduces support for President Vladimir Putin. This effect is stronger in settings with histories of robust electoral competition. This suggests that the public is more likely to punish incumbents for abolishing elections when those elections are perceived as meaningful.

Endogenous Popularity: How Perceptions of Regime Support Affect the Popularity of Authoritarian Regimes (with Kyle Marquardt, Ora John Reuter, and Katerina Tertytchnaya) American Political Science Review, 2024, 118(2):1046-1052 DOI

Abstract Being popular makes it easier for dictators to govern. A growing body of scholarship therefore focuses on the factors that influence authoritarian popularity. However, it is possible that the perception of popularity itself affects incumbent approval in autocracies. We use framing experiments embedded in four surveys in Russia to examine this phenomenon. These experiments reveal that manipulating information—and thereby perceptions—about Russian President Vladimir Putin’s popularity can significantly affect respondents’ support for him. Additional analyses indicate that these changes in support are not due to preference falsification, but are in fact genuine. This study has implications for research on support for authoritarian leaders and defection cascades in nondemocratic regimes.

Staying Out of Trouble: Criminal Cases Against Russian Mayors (with Ora John Reuter, Michael Rochlitz, and Anton Aisin) Comparative Political Studies, 2022, 55(9):1539-1568 DOI

Abstract Although repression against elites is a common occurrence in authoritarian regimes, we know little about which elites are targeted. This paper uses an original dataset on the prosecution of mayors in large Russian cities to examine the factors that make elites more likely to be arrested. We argue that in electoral authoritarian regimes like Russia, regime leaders are reluctant to arrest popular officials. Such officials command political capital that is useful to the regime, and arrests of prominent officials can produce popular backlash. We examine this argument using an original dataset on all arrests of municipal leaders in Russia’s 221 largest cities between 2002 and 2018. We find that mayors who won their elections by large margins are less likely to be arrested. In addition, we document several other substantively important patterns: (1) a mayor’s professional background is not related to the likelihood of arrest, (2) opposition mayors are four times more likely to be arrested, and (3) mobilization of votes for the regime is not protective against arrest.

Who Reports Crime? Citizen Engagement with the Police in Russia and Georgia (with Timothy Frye, Scott Gehlbach, and Lauren McCarthy) Europe-Asia Studies, 2021, 73(1):8-35 DOI

Abstract What factors affect citizens’ engagement with the state? We explore this question through a study of victims’ and bystanders’ willingness to report crimes to the police, using data from survey experiments conducted in Russia and Georgia. We find that citizens’ willingness to report in both countries is strongly influenced by the nature of the crime, but not generally by instruments that the state might use to encourage greater reporting. Our results recommend scepticism about the ability of governments to easily engineer citizens’ engagement with the state.

Performance Incentives under Autocracy: Evidence from Russia’s Regions (with Ora John Reuter) Comparative Politics, 2019, 51(2):239-266 DOI

Abstract Available evidence indicates that there is considerable variation among autocracies in the extent to which subnational officials are rewarded for economic growth. Why is economic performance used as a criterion for appointment in some autocracies but not in others? We argue that in more competitive—though still autocratic—regimes, the political imperatives of maintaining an electoral machine that can win semi-competitive elections leads regime leaders to abandon cadre policies that promote economic development. Using data on turnover among high-level economic bureaucrats in Russia’s 89 regions between 2001 and 2012, we find that performance-based appointments are more frequent in less competitive regions. These findings demonstrate one way that semi-competitive elections can actually undermine economic development under autocracy.

Staring at the West through Kremlin-tinted Glasses: Russian Mass and Elite Divergence in Attitudes toward the United States, European Union, and Ukraine before and after Crimea (with Joshua A. Tucker) Post-Soviet Affairs, 2019, 35(5-6):365-375 DOI

Abstract In this paper, we investigate the divergence in Russian public opinion between the masses and elites in terms of attitudes toward foreign countries in the post-Crimea era. To do so, we combine elite surveys conducted in Russia from 2000 to 2016 with an extensive database of Levada Center mass public opinion polling to test two competing models for explaining the observed divergence in mass and elite opinion: a demographic-driven Common Determinants model and a novel Kremlin Cueing model. More specifically, we assess the extent to which a set of demographic variables trained on a model of mass attitudes is able to predict elite attitudes. Our empirical evidence is more consistent with the predictions of the Kremlin Cueing model, indicating that, in some cases, elite opinion reacts very differently to shocks such as the Crimea crisis due to “where they sit” rather than who they are as individuals.

Local Elections in Authoritarian Regimes: An Elite-Based Theory with Evidence from Russian Mayoral Elections (with Ora John Reuter, Guzel Garifullina, and Alexandra Shubenkova) Comparative Political Studies, 2016, 49(5):662-697 DOI

Abstract Why do authoritarian regimes permit elections in some settings but not in others? Focusing on the decision to hold subnational elections, we argue that autocrats can use local elections to assuage powerful subnational elites. When subnational elites control significant political resources, such as local political machines, leaders may need to co-opt them to govern cost-effectively. Elections are an effective tool of co-optation because they provide elites with autonomy and the opportunity to cultivate their own power bases. We test this argument by analyzing variation in the decision to hold mayoral elections in Russia’s 207 largest cities between 2000 and 2012. Our findings suggest that Russian mayoral elections were more likely to be retained in cities where elected mayors sat atop strong political machines. Our findings also illustrate how subnational elections may actually serve to perpetuate authoritarianism by helping to ensure elite loyalty and putting the resources of powerful elites to work for the regime.

Cooperating with the State: Evidence from Survey Experiments on Policing (with Timothy Frye, Scott Gehlbach, and Lauren McCarthy) Journal of Experimental Political Science, 2016, 3(2):124-139 DOI

Abstract We examine cooperation with the state using a series of survey experiments on policing conducted in late 2011 in Moscow, Russia, where distrust of the state is high and attempts to reform the police have been ineffective. Through various vignettes that place respondents in situations in which they are the witness or victim of a crime, we experimentally manipulate crime severity, identity of the perpetrator (whether the crime is committed by a police officer), monetary rewards, appeals to civic duty, and the opportunity cost of time spent reporting. Of these factors, crime severity and identity of the perpetrator are robustly associated with a propensity to report. Our research design and results contribute to a large literature on cooperation with the state by examining variables that may be more salient or function differently in countries with weak institutions than in developed democracies.

The Political Economy of Russian Gubernatorial Elections and Appointments (with Timothy Frye, Guzel Garifullina, and Ora John Reuter) Europe-Asia Studies, 2014, 66(8):1213-1233

Abstract Political and economic outcomes depend, in part, on the quality of the officials making policy. Many scholars argue that free and fair elections are the best method for selecting competent officials. Others, however, argue that elections can lead to the selection of amateurs, demagogues, and political sycophants. Under this view, sub-national officials should be appointed by centralized planners who are insulated from local popular pressures. In this paper, we use original data on the biographies of Russian regional governors to determine whether the backgrounds of governors elected between 1992 and 2004 differ from the backgrounds of appointed governors post-2004. We find that the two groups are surprisingly similar on many dimensions.

Elections, Appointments, and Human Capital: The Case of Russian Mayors (with Guzel Garifullina, Ora John Reuter, and Alexandra Shubenkova) Demokratizatsiya, 2014, 22(1):87-116

Abstract How do the personal characteristics of elected and appointed subnational officials differ? We address this question using an original dataset of Russian mayors collected between 2000 and 2012. We find that elected mayors are more likely to have built careers in business or legislative posts and to have held prior elected office, while appointed mayors are slightly more likely to come from the local or regional executive branch.

Working Papers

A Watched Pot Boiling: Street Protest and Public Opinion in Authoritarian Russia Presented at ASEEES 2021

Abstract When does street protest breed more dissatisfaction with the status quo? The threat of mass public protest looms large for authoritarian regimes, yet scholars know relatively little about how protest affects public opinion in autocracies. In this paper, I examine the effects of exposure to protest on attitudes toward regime actors and on willingness to engage in future protest. Combining 220,000 survey responses from Russia (2007–2019) with data on 5,000 protest events in a generalized difference-in-differences design, I find that protest significantly depresses approval of regional governors (3–4 percentage points) but has smaller effects on Putin approval (1.5–2 pp). Local issue protests particularly affect local officials, while broader political protests show weaker effects on central regime support. These results suggest that protest serves as an informational shock that enables citizens to “blame the right target” for governance failures—a disillusionment mechanism—rather than triggering broader cascades of regime defection.

Rotten Eggs or Bad Apples: Corruption Arrests and Public Opinion in Authoritarian Russia

Abstract Information about corruption can be a powerful force in shaping how the public assesses politicians and the political system. In autocracies, malfeasance frequently serves as a spark for discontent. As a result, authoritarian leaders often attempt to portray egregious cases of corruption in a neutral or positive light: these are merely a few bad apples, whom the regime is evidently finding success in rooting out. When does the public view corrupt officials as emblematic of a rotten regime and when do they see them as isolated cases of an imperfect regime doing its best to clean house? In this paper, I examine the effects of officials in an authoritarian regime being legally punished for corruption on public opinion. I compile a dataset of millions of public opinion survey responses regarding regime approval in Putin-era Russia from 2003-2020 and combine this with extensive region-level data on the arrest, prosecution, and jailing of officials. Together with a difference-in-differences design, this allows me to identify the positive, negative, or neutral effects of the discovery of corruption in an authoritarian regime on the public’s attitudes.

Economic Blame Attribution in Times of Boom and Bust: The Case of Authoritarian Russia Presented at EPSA 2018